

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15

PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 /054 W

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O R 031806Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2973

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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DEFENSE FOR ISA-GLITMAN AND GENERAL PUSTAY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG, AWACS, MILI

SUBJECT: FRG-NATO MILITARY MATTERS

REFS: (A) USNATO 5422; (B) STATE 269949

SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATIONS TODAY, TWO SENIOR GERMAN MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE TOLD US THAT AMBASSADOR PAULS' REMARKS AT THE OCT 5 NPG PERMREPS' MEETING SHOULD NOT BE OVER-INTERPRETED, THAT COSTS OF THE AWACS GROUND SYSTEM NEED TO BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD BEFORE A DECISION ON THE OVERALL SYSTEM CAN BE MADE, AND THAT LEBER TOLD BRITISH DEFENSE MINISTER MULLEY THAT THE FRG WOULD TRY TO HELP THE BRITISH ECONOMY BUT COULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO OFFSET FOR THE BAOR. END SUMMARY

1. DURING SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS TODAY, GENERALS WUST (ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF FRG ARMED FORCES) AND BRANDT (HEAD OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY POLITICAL DEPT) STATED THE FOLLOWING WITH REGARD TO NPG PLANNING, AWACS,

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AND THE LEBER-MULLEY MEETING OF NOVEMBER 2:

2. NPG PLANNING.

WUST SAID PAULS' REMARKS WERE NOT INTENDED TO QUESTION NATO'S BASIC STRATEGY OR TO SUGGEST THAT THERE COULD OR SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC BALANCE SEPARATE FROM THE GENERAL STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE SAID THE FRG WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE TRIAD AND DID NOT WISH TO IMPLY ANY INTEREST IN DECOUPLING.

3. WUST ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE PAULS AGAIN BEFORE THE NPG MEETING, AND THAT HE WOULD ALSO BE TALKING IN DETAIL WITH LEBER. HE WOULD MAKE SURE THAT ANY GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE NPG DISCUSSIONS WOULD REFLECT THE GENERAL GERMAN DESIRE TO HANDLE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS THROUGH AN OVERALL ALLIANCE EFFORT RATHER THAN THROUGH A EUROPEAN EFFORT.

4. GENERAL BRANDT SAID PAULS' REMARKS WERE INTENDED TO REFLECT FRG CONCERN OVER THE IMBALANCE IN EUROPEAN THEATRE STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE INSTALLATION OF THE SOVIET SS-20'S. HE SAID THAT SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES NOW BEARING ON THE EUROPEAN BALANCE WERE FULLY TARGETTED AND THAT THEIR LOCATION AS WELL AS PROBABLE TARGETS WERE KNOWN FACTORS. THE SS-20'S, HOWEVER, WOULD BE MOBILE AND WOULD NOT BE SO CONFIGURED THAT THEIR TARGETS COULD BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE. THIS REPRESENTED A GREAT THREAT TO EUROPE, A THREAT WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT EXPLOIT FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AS THEY HAD DONE AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE 1956 EGYPTIAN CRISIS. BRANDT ADDED THAT THE SALT TALKS DEALT WITH INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE MBFR TALKS DEALT WITH FORCES LOCATED IN THE NGA. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE THREAT FELL BETWEEN THESE TWO FORA AND HAD TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY SINCE IT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE REDUCIBLE BY NEGOTIATIONS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WAS BY COORDINATING ALL STRATEGIC FORCES AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, BY RETARGETING, NOT BY TRYING TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE EUROPEAN BALANCE.

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5. BOTH GENERALS LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT PAULS' OCTOBER 5TH REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE OVER-INTERPRETED, SINCE HE DID NOT YET HAVE GREAT EXPERIENCE WITH EUROPEAN NUCLEAR MATTERS.

6. AWACS.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION (REF B) REGARDING GERMAN  
VIEWS ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A NATO GROUND SYSTEM TO  
SUPPORT AWACS, WUST SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY

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CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15

PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 /054 W  
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O R 031806Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2974

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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THIS ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN SETTLED A LONG TIME AGO. HE  
REMARKED (AS OTHER GERMANS HAVE) THAT ONE PROBLEM WITH  
AWACS WAS THAT THE SYSTEM HAD BEEN DEVELOPED BEFORE THE  
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT. THIS HAD MEANT THAT MANY NATO  
STUDIES HAD NOT BEEN DONE AS CAREFULLY AS THEY MIGHT  
HAVE BEEN. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A NADGE STUDY SUGGEST-  
ING THAT THE NATO GROUND INFRASTRUCTURE MIGHT HAVE TO BE  
EXPANDED FOR AWACS AT THE COST OF ABOUT \$L50 MILLION,  
BUT HE WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THIS STUDY.

7. WUST SAID THE FRG SAW TWO PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO A  
GROUND SYSTEM TO SUPPORT AWACS: FIRST, SOME SYSTEM  
WOULD HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED THAT WOULD GET THE AWACS  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE APPROPRIATE USER BY THE  
MOST DIRECT CHANNEL; SECOND, SOME SYSTEM NEEDED TO BE

DEVELOPED TO GIVE THE RIGHT COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION TO THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WITHOUT SUCH SYSTEMS, THE AWACS REPRESENTED A POINTLESS EXPENDITURE BECAUSE ITS ENORMOUS POTENTIAL COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY USED BY THE ALLIANCE. WUST DID NOT GET INTO  
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SPECIFIC TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ON THIS SCORE BUT SIMPLY OBSERVED THAT HE KNEW OF NO DECENT NATO STUDY THAT COVERED THE ASSOCIATED GROUND COSTS FOR AN AEW SYSTEM AND THAT HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND TO HIS MINISTER OR TO THE BUNDESTAG A FULL COMMITMENT TO THE SYSTEM UNTIL SUCH A STUDY HAD BEEN MADE.

8. WUST REITERATED THE USUAL GERMAN PROBLEMS REGARDING TIMING OF AWACS COSTS AT THE SAME TIME THAT OTHER MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE FALLING DUE, AND SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET FOUND ANY OFFICER IN ANY GERMAN MILITARY SERVICE WHO WAS READY TO REDUCE EXPENDITURES FOR SUCH THINGS AS THE MRCA OR THE TANK IN ORDER TO ALLOCATE THE FUNDS TO AWACS. HE SAID THAT HE AND LEBER FEARED THESE OFFICERS WOULD INFLUENCE BUNDESTAG COMMITTEES AGAINST AWACS UNLESS ALL ISSUES (LIKE THE GROUND SYSTEM) COULD BE NAILED DOWN IN ADVANCE.

9. WUST ADDED THAT HE HOPED GENERAL PUSTAY WOULD HAVE SOME IDEA ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. OTHERWISE, HE OBSERVED, GENERAL PUSTAY'S PROJECTED VISIT WOULD NOT HELP THE GERMANS TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE AWACS ISSUE.

10. IN CONCLUDING ON AWACS, HOWEVER, WUST STRESSED THAT THE FRG'S BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARD AWACS REMAINED POSITIVE. HE SAID THE FRG COULD SEE MANY ADVANTAGES TO THE SYSTEM, BUT AS YET HAD SEEN NO SOLUTION TO SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT IT HAD RAISED.

11. BRANDT COVERED MUCH THE SAME MATERIAL AS WUST, ALSO STATING THAT HE WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IF HE KNEW OF ANY NATO STUDY THAT ADEQUATELY SURVEYED THE ASSOCIATED GROUND COSTS. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF PROBLEM THAT BOTHERED THE GERMANS, HE CITED THE CASE OF AN AIRCRAFT COMING FROM EAST GERMANY OVER THE BORDER; HE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT INFORMATION ON THIS AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO COME BOTH TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND TO THE COMMANDER OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNIT THAT COULD SHOOT DOWN THE OFFENDER. TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, NO SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS NOW IN CONSTRUCTION OR EVEN IN THE  
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PLANNING STAGE.

12. BRANDT ALSO SAID THAT HE SOMETIMES WORRIED ABOUT WHETHER AWACS WOULD REALLY DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD FACE BY THE MID 1980'S AND BEYOND. FOR EXAMPLE, HE OBSERVED, A CONFLICT IN EUROPE MIGHT WELL ARISE NOT THROUGH A CENTRAL CONFRONTATION BUT THROUGH THE EXPANSION OF PERIPHERAL BATTLES AROUND SPITZBERGEN OR SOMEWHERE IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT AWACS WOULD, UNFORTUNATELY, OFFER NO RESPONSE TO THE SS-20, SINCE IT COULD NOT TRACE THE MOVEMENTS OF THOSE MISSILES.

13. BRANDT SAID THAT, DESPITE ALL THIS, HE STILL FELT THAT LEBER WOULD TRY AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL TO MAKE A POSITIVE IF CONDITIONAL STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF AWACS. HE SAID THE GERMAN PARLIAMENTARY SCHEDULE NOW SUGGESTED THAT THE NEW BUNDESTAG COMMITTEES WOULD BE FORMED AND OPERATING BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE THOUGHT AWACS COULD PERHAPS BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE. THAT, HE HOPED, WOULD ASSURE A DECISION BY MARCH, THOUGH NOTHING COULD BE CERTAIN.

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CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15

PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 /054 W

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O R 031806Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2975

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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THE BUDGET COMMITTEE PRESENTED MORE OF A PROBLEM. THERE, THE CRISIS IN THE PENSION SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA. IT WAS NOT CERTAIN WHEN THAT COMMITTEE COULD GET TO AWACS.

14. BRANDT SAID THAT DURING THE MULLEY-LEBER MEETING ON NOVEMBER 2, THE BRITISH HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD WAIT UNTIL MARCH FOR A DEFINITIVE GERMAN DECISION ALTHOUGH THEY WISHED THE MOST POSITIVE POSSIBLE ENDORSEMENT BY DECEMBER. LEBER HAD TOLD MULLEY HE WOULD TRY TO DO HIS BEST, AND BRANDT BELIEVED LEBER WOULD BEND EVERY EFFORT TO SUPPORT AWACS IF THE COST PROBLEMS AND THE QUESTION OF NATO PARTICIPATION COULD BE SOLVED.

15. (DURING THIS PHASE OF THE DISCUSSION THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR REITERATED US VIEWS REGARDING AWACS AND PARTICULARLY OUR DESIRE FOR AN FRG COMMITMENT IN DECEMBER. NEITHER WUST NOR BRANDT ARE IN ANY DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARD THIS QUESTION.)

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16. THE LEBER-MULLEY MEETING.

BRANDT SAID THAT, ASIDE FROM AWACS, THE LEBER-MULLEY MEETING FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE BRITISH DESIRE TO GET GERMAN HELP FOR BAOR EXPENSES. HE SAID MULLEY TOLD LEBER THAT THE FALL OF THE POUND HAD RAISED BAOR COSTS PER ANNUM FROM 420 MILLION POUNDS TO 500 MILLION POUNDS. MULLEY HAD SAID THAT THE BRITISH SIMPLY COULD NOT PAY THIS AND THAT THEY HOPED THE FRG COULD PICK UP THE DIFFERENCE. MULLEY HAD CITED THE FRG COMMITMENT TO PAY FOR NORTHAG BRIGADE INSTALLATION AS A SIGN THAT THE FRG COULD STILL MAKE COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT FOREIGN TROOPS.

17. ACCORDING TO BRANDT, LEBER HAD TOLD MULLEY THE FRG WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PAY OFFSET, AND THAT THE NORTHAG EXPENSES REPRESENTED CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS RATHER THAN OPERATING EXPENSES. LEBER HAD TOLD MULLEY THE FRG UNDERSTOOD THE BRITISH PROBLEM AND WOULD DO ALL IT COULD

TO HELP BRITAIN ECONOMICALLY. THIS, LEBER THOUGHT, SHOULD EASE THE BRITISH BAOR BURDEN BY STRENGTHENING THE POUND AND BRITISH RESERVES. ACCORDING TO BRANDT, MULLEY HAD APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST PARTLY SATISFIED.

18. BRANDT REMARKED THAT CALLAGHAN'S REMARKS LINKING BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT AND HER NATO COMMITMENTS HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN INTENDED AT LEAST IN PART FOR GERMAN EARS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE GERMANS WOULD TRY TO HELP THE BRITISH IN A GENERAL WAY, BUT THAT SCHMIDT'S POLITICAL COMMITMENT AGAINST OFFSET FUNDS WAS TOO DEEP TO SHAKE ON THIS ISSUE.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, BURDENSARING, RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ORGS, OPERATING COSTS, REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 NOV 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976BONN18556  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760410-0599  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19761187/aaaacxkb.tel  
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**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 STATE 269949  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 06 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <06 APR 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <30 JUL 2004 by BoyleJA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** FRG-NATO MILITARY MATTERS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MNUC, MILI, GE, UK, NATO, NPG  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006